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I.

INTRODUCTION

III.

IV.

V.

The constitutionality of mandatory sentences raises difficult and
complex questions at the intersection of constitutional law and sentencing.
When a court is asked to strike down or not apply a mandatory sentence as
a form of cruel and unusual punishment contrary to section 12 of the
Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms,' it is being asked to engage in

judicial review of a democratically enacted law. The court's view of its
relationship with the legislature is bound to enter into the equation, At the
same time, the court is also being asked to determine whether the
mandatory sentence is grossly disproportionate to what would otherwise be
an appropriate and fit sentence. Its view of the purposes and principles of
sentencing and the priority of these competing concerns is also bound to

I Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
II [hereinafter Charterl.
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enter into the equation. In short, the court's decision about whether a
mandatory sentence is cruel and unusual punishment wil depend on its
approaches to both constitutional law and sentencing.
Much has changed in both fields since the Supreme Court's 1937
decision in R. v. Smith' where it struck down a seven-year mandatory
minimum sentence for the importation of narcotics as an unjustified form
of cruel and unusual punishment. My concern is not only with the twists and
turns that can be detected in the doctrine, but also with deeper and more
fundamental shifts in both constitutional law and sentencing. With respect
to the former, the Court has become more restrained about applying the
Charterto potentially overbroad laws and more deferential to Parliament's
decision to enact mandatory penalties that stress some purposes of
punishment over others. The Court also seems to be increasingly attracted
to the constitutional minimalism and passive virtues involved in deciding
cases one at a time, even if that means leaving in place laws that can result
in cruel and unusual punishment. It has also departed from a strict due
process approach to protecting the constitutional rights of the accused and,
instead, has balanced competing rights and interests in criminal justice,
often deferring to Parliament's attempt to protect victims and potential
victims of crime.
The changes in sentencing since Smith have been equally dramatic.
Parliament codified the principles and purposes of sentencing in 1996 and
the Court has, since that time, decided an unprecedented number of
sentencing appeals. Parliament has proclaimed the proportionality of the
sentence to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the
offender as the fundamental principle of sentencing. Furthermore,
Parliament has significantly increased the number of mandatory sentences
in an attempt to deter and denounce a broad range of crimes involving
firearms and child prostitution. The Court has recognized denunciation and
retribution as legitimate purposes of sentencing and has drawn a dichotomy
between punitive purposes that focus on punishing the offender and
deterring others and, restorative purposes that focus on rehabilitating the
offender and responding to the needs of the offender, the victim and, the
community. Understanding the doctrinal shifts in constitutional law and
sentencing, both on the surface and at the deeper level of structural
changes, is necessary to develop a sense of the impact, if any, that the
Court's approach to section 12 of the Chartermight have on mandatory
sentences in the future.

2 [1987] I SC.R. 1045 [hereinafter Smith].
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The first Part of this article will outline the evolving jurisprudence
about whether mandatory sentences constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. Since its decision in Smith,3 the Court has upheld every
mandatory minimum sentence that has been challenged under section 12
of the Charter. These sentences include mandatory life imprisonment,
ineligibility for parole for twenty-five years for first degree murder in R. v.
Luxton;4 mandatory life imprisonment, ineligibility for parole for at least
ten years for second degree murder in R. v. Latimer;5 a seven-day
mandatory minimum sentence for driving with a suspended license in R. v.
Goltz;6 and a four-year mandatory minimum sentence for criminal
negligence causing death with a firearm in R. v. Morrisey.
The second Part will examine these decisions in light of the Court's
changing approaches to Charterreview. The Court's increased restraint in
striking down mandatory sentences on the basis of their cruel and unusual
effects on hypothetical offenders will be related to its increased attraction
to "constitutional minimalism" or "deciding one case at a time."8 This
section will also examine how the Court's increased deference to mandatory
sentences is related to more general patterns of deference to the ability of
legislatures to balance competing interests and to protect the
disadvantaged-in this case, victims and potential victims of crime. Finally,
it will be suggested that the Court's approach to mandatory sentences in the
context of murder and regulatory offences is linked with related rulings
requiring proof of fault for those offences. As required by constitutional
standards, the Court has increasingly emphasized the offender's fault as a
justification for imposing mandatory penalties of imprisonment, even
though traditionally, sentencing has not been exclusively calibrated on the
basis of the offender's fault.
Part three will evaluate the section 12 cases in light of changing
approaches to sentencing, especially the increased acceptance of retributive
"just deserts" principles that focus on sentencing as a response to the

3 Ibi.
4 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 [hereinafter Luxtonl.
5[200111 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Latimer]. In this case, the author represented the Canadian Civil
Liberties Association (CCLA), which intervened to argue that the mandatory sentence violated s. 12 of
the Charter.
6 [19911 3 S.C.R. 485 [hereinafter Goltz1.
7[2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 [hereinafter Morrisey].
8 See generally C. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalismn on the Supreme Court
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
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offender's fault in committing a crime. Since Smith, the Court has become
more prepared to focus on the gravity of the offence and the offender's
responsibility for the offence, as measured by niens rea, as opposed to the
need to deter or rehabilitate offenders in light of their particular
characteristics. The Court intervened in Smith because it was not necessary
to send a hypothetical first-time nineteen-year-old offender who imported
a joint of marijuana after spring break, to the penitentiary for seven years
in order to prevent such a person from committing crimes in the future. In
the more recent case of Morise,, however, it rejected the appeal of the
remorseful first-time offender and recovering alcoholic who, after a trauma
in his life, unintentionally and while drunk killed his friend with a firearm,
even though a four-year sentence was probably not required to deter or
rehabilitate this particular offender.
Although the Court also recognized that life imprisonment and
ineligibility for parole for ten years was not necessary to protect the public
or to rehabilitate Mr. Robert Latimer, it nonetheless upheld the mandatory
sentence in his case. The lack of utility of the mandatory sentence as
applied to Latimer, given his personal characteristics and circumstances,
did not, in the Court's view, outweigh the need to denounce murder as the
most serious crime. The gravity of the murder was measured by the mens
rea requirement as opposed to the offender's motive. The Court built on
the acceptance of denunciation and retribution in R. v. M(CA)' and
Parliament's proclamation of proportionality as the fundamental principle
of sentencing, to uphold mandatory sentences in Morrisey and Latimer.It
did so on the basis that Parliament was entitled to stress denunciation,
retribution, and general deterrence over concerns about rehabilitation and
deterrence of the particular offender, which had driven the decision in
Smith. The dichotomy between the punitive and restorative aims of
sentencing found in R. v. Gladue' and the conditional sentencing cases has
had the ironic effect of legitimating mandatory sentences that Parliament
clearly placed on the punitive side of the line.
The last Part will briefly speculate on what role, if any, the Court's
decisions on the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences might
play in sentencing in the future. In one of the first articles that I wrote as an
academic, I predicted that because of its concern with offender

9 [19 9 6] 1 S.C.R. 500 [hereinafter M
(C A4].
10[1999I S.C.R. 68 [hereinafter Gladue]. In thiscase, the author rcprewntedAbangina
Legal

Services of Toronto. which intern ened in support of the accuscd's apgzal, See also R PFi:du
'.
jZ03]
1 SC.R. 61 [hereinafter Proukl.
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characteristics and what was necessary to deter or rehabilitate specific
offenders, "Smith will act as an individualizing brake on shifts to retributive
philosophies of sentencing and determinate sentencing practices."" No
one, not even a wet behind the ears law professor, could make the same
claim about the recent cases. Morrisey suggests that section 12 of the
Charterwill not be an effective barrier to the development of mandatory
sentences even for non-intentional crimes that result in serious harm.
Together with Latimer, it suggests that the Court will take a narrow
approach to the moral responsibility of offenders and the circumstances of
offences by focusing on the mens rea of the crime committed as a primary
justification for the imposition of mandatory sentences. It appears as if the
Court will defer to Parliament's decision to stress denunciation, retribution,
and deterrence over specific deterrence, rehabilitation, and the restorative
principles of sentencing. If the Court does intervene when a mandatory
sentence causes injustice, the current signs are that it will do so with caseby-case exemptions that, unlike in Smith, will leave the mandatory
minimum sentence intact.
The decision of whether to have mandatory sentences now appears
to be almost exclusively in the hands of Parliament. This is alarming
because only the independent judiciary can withstand the political allure of
mandatory sentences. The courts are uniquely situated to draw the
attention of Parliament and the public to the adverse effects of mandatory
sentences in particular cases and to defend the need for continuing judicial
discretion in tailoring punishment to particular crimes and particular
offenders. A return to the activism of Smith would not necessarily give the
Court the final word on matters of penal policy, but it would add an
important voice in favour of individualized punishment to the debate.
II.

THE EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY SENTENCES

A.

Smith

The Supreme Court's first decision on the constitutionality of
mandatory sentences was Smith, which involved the constitutionality of the
mandatory minimum of seven-years imprisonment for importing narcotics.
The case involved a twenty-seven-year-old man with prior convictions who

11 See K. Roach, "Smith and the Supreme Court: Implications for Sentencing Policy and Reform"
(1989) 11 S.C.L.R. 433 at 473.
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returned from Bolivia with seven and one-half ounces of cocaine worth
more than one hundred thousand dollars and was sentenced to eight-years
imprisonment for importing narcotics. In his plurality judgment, Mr. Justice
Lamer indicated that courts should show deference to Parliament and not
invalidate every mandatory sentence, but only those that were grossly
disproportionate and excessive so as to outrage standards of decency. He
also warned that courts should not "stigmatize every disproportionate or
excessive sentence" as unconstitutional, thereby precluding the role of
appeals on fitness of sentencing. Despite these notes of caution, Mr. Justice
Lamer stressed that the pursuit of constitutionally valid penal purposes did
not ensure the validity of mandatory sentences. Courts should examine not
only the gravity of the offence and the circumstances of the case, but also
"the personal characteristics of the offender ... in order to determine what
range of sentences would have been appropriate to punish, rehabilitate, or
deter this particular offender or to protect the public from this particular
offender.""2 The focus on the particular case and the personal
characteristics of the particular offender played an important role in Mr.
Justice Lamer's conclusion that the mandatory sentence was cruel and
unusual because it could be applied to a young person caught bringing a
joint of marijuana back to Canada after spring break. The hypothetical
offender was a nineteen-year-old student who imported a very small
amount of drugs as his or her first offence.
Having concluded that the mandatory minimum sentence of sevenyears imprisonment would be cruel and unusual as applied to such a
sympathetic offender, Mr. Justice Lamer held that the section 12 violation
had not been justified under section 1 of the Charter. Although the
mandatory sentence was rationally connected to the important objective of
deterring the import of drugs, there was "no need to be indiscriminate" and
Parliament could have tailored the mandatory penalty so that it did not
apply to small-time offenders.
In his dissent, Mr. Justice McIntyre argued that there was "an air
of unreality about this appeal" because the mandatory sentence was not
cruel and unusual as applied to Mr. Smith, who definitely was neither a
small-time nor first offender. He concluded that the seven-year mandatory
minimum was not so long as to outrage the public conscience or degrade
human dignity, especially when it was considered that an offender caught
by the seven-year mandatory minimum would be eligible for day parole in
a little over a year and full parole after twenty-eight months. He also

1

2 Supra note 2 at 1074.
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warned that the Court should be careful not to question the wisdom of the
mandatory penalty. Parliament was entitled to determine that the gravity
of importing narcotics and the need to deter the drug trade "are of
paramount importance and that, consequently, the circumstances of the
particular accused should be given relatively less weight.""3 Mister Justice
McIntyre's lengthy dissent in Smith is of more than historical interest
because many of its themes are reflected in the Court's recent decisions in
Morrisey and Latimer.
B.

The Dangerous Offender Cases

The same year that it struck down the mandatory minimum
sentence of seven years for importing narcotics, the Supreme Court upheld
the dangerous offender provisions. This could be seen as the flip side of
Smith because both decisions were premised on the Court's acceptance of
the multiple purposes of sentencing including instrumental concerns about
preventing or deterring future crime. The difference was that in the
dangerous offender cases, the Court deferred to Parliament's decision to
emphasize future protection from dangerous offenders as opposed to
maintaining its approach in Smith that Parliament's mandatory sentence
was grossly disproportionate to what was necessary to ensure that young
first-time offenders did not commit future crimes. Mister Justice La Forest,
for the majority in the dangerous offender cases, stated that:
[i]n a rational system of sentencing, the respective importance of prevention, deterrence,
retribution, and rehabilitation will vary according to the nature of the crime and the
circumstances of the offender. No one would suggest that any of these functional
considerations should be excluded from the legitimate purview of legislative or judicial
decisions regarding sentencing."

Only Mr. Justice Estey, in dissent, defended a retributive approach
by arguing it has "long been an element of the criminal law of this country
that sentences must be proportionate to the offence committed."'" He
stressed that indeterminate detention was disproportionate to the crimes
committed by the offender, namely break and enter, theft, unlawful use of
a weapon during a sexual assault, and unlawful use of a firearm during an
indictable offence.

13 Ibid. at 121.
14 Lyons v. The Queen, [1987J 2 S.C.R. 309 at 329.
15 Milne v. The Queen, [198712 S.C.R. 512 at
531.
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In 1990, the Court intervened to hold that the continued detention
of a fifty-five-year-old sexual offender who had been imprisoned for thirtyseven years under dangerous offender provisions constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. It stressed the facts of the case, adding:
[ilt will only be on rare and unique occasions that a court v, dl find a Ecntcnce so grossly
disproportionate that it violates the proxisions of s 12 of the Chartcr. The test for
determining whether a sentence is disproportionately long is %cryprorerly stringent and
demanding. A lesser test would tend to triialize the Charter.

The caution and focus on the facts of the individual in this case set
the tone for subsequent judgments.
Luxton

C.

7

In 1990, the Court inLuxton upheld the mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment with ineligibility for parole for twenty-five years for first
degree murder in a case where the accused stabbed a cab driver to death
while forcibly confining her. Chief Justice Lamer stressed that any person
convicted of murder would now be constitutionally required to have at least
subjective knowledge that the victim was likely to die. t 0There was added
blameworthiness because a person convicted of first degree murder under
section 231(5) of the CriminalCode"9 would have:
exploited a position of power and dominance to the gravest extent poutble by murdering the
person that he or she is forcibly confining. The punishment is not exces7ie and clearly does
not outrage our standards of decency .. it is within the purview of Parliament, in order to
meet the objectives of a rational system of sentencing, to treat our most serious crime vth
an appropriate degree of certainty and severity

The severe penalty "demonstrates a proportionality between the
moral turpitude of the offender and the malignity of the offence" with
particular attention to the fact that the offender had subjective foresight of
death and was illegally dominating the victim. With respect to offender
characteristics and the effects of long term punishment, the Court noted

16

Stede v. MountainInstitute, [19901 2 S.CR, 13q5 at 1417.
17Supra note 4.
isSee the companion case of)P. v. Martincau.11990) 2 SCR. 633.
19
R.S.C. 1935, c. C-46 [hereinafter Code].
20 Supra note 4 at 460.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.

39, NO. 2 & 3

that the offender could apply for the Royal Prerogative of Mercy,
temporary absences for humanitarian reasons, and to a jury after fifteen
years, to be declared eligible for parole. The Court, of course, could not
knowwhether Mr. Luxton would actually receive any of these privileges and
in the years since its decision "these opportunities to make individual
claims for leniency, mercy, or special consideration, have been diminished
both by statute and practice." 2'
D.

The License Suspension Cases

In a six to three decision in 1991, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a mandatory minimum sentence of seven-days
imprisonment for the offence of knowingly driving with a suspended
license. For the majority, Mr. Justice Gonthier argued that the Court of
Appeal and, by implication, his dissenting colleagues, had given
"insufficient weight to the gravity of the offence." 22 He stressed that Mr.
Goltz "knowingly and contemptuously" and without any excuse, violated a
prohibition against driving as a result of past driving infractions. 23 Following
Smith, Mr. Justice Gonthier recognized the need to also examine the
particular circumstances of the case, the personal characteristics of the
offender, and the effects of the sentence on the offender. He noted that
Goltz's mandatory minimum seven-day sentence could be served on
weekends to enable him to continue to work. In the event of true hardship,
Mr. Justice Gonthier hypothesized that he could be temporally released. As
was the case in Luxton, the Court could not be sure whether a particular
offender would receive such discretionary treatment. In considering the
role of hypotheticals, he stressed that the Court should not consider remote
and extreme examples and suggested that a person who drove in an
emergency while prohibited might have a necessity defence.
Madame Justice McLachlin (with the concurrence of Chief Justice
Lamer) dissented on the basis that the Court was obliged to consider a
broader range of circumstances in which the mandatory penalty could be
applied. Some drivers might have been prohibited from driving because of
a failure to pay licensing fees or court judgments as opposed to a bad
driving record. Madame Justice McLachlin also examined the hypothetical
example of a prohibited driver who moves a car at a scene of an accident

21 A. Manson, The Law of Sentencing (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 295-96.
22 Goltz, supra note 6 at
506.
23 Ibid. at 502.
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and who lost his or her job because of the mandatory seven days of
imprisonment. In this case, the dissent reflected the concern about
hypothetical offenders that was apparent in Smith.
Four years later, the Court was required to return to British
Columbia's mandatory minimum sentence of seven-days imprisonment for
driving while prohibited, when it held that the sentence violated section 7
of the Charter. In R. v. Pontes,4 driving with a prohibited license was found
to be an absolute liability offence, unlike the offence in Golt-, which
required that the accused knowingly drive while prohibited from doing so.
The Court indicated that people comicted without fault under an absolute
liability offence could not be imprisoned under section 7 of the Charter.
Once again, the focus in this case was on whether the gravity and the
blameworthiness of the offence justified the mandatory penalty of
imprisonment, and not on the personal characteristics of the offender.
Tfust 5

E.

After its 1991 decision in Goltz, the Court did not revisit mandatory
sentences for nearly a decade. In R. v. 1t1st, the Court held that the new
mandatory minimum sentence of four years for robbery with a firearm,
could be reduced by the amount of time spent by the accused in custody
before conviction. As a matter of statutory interpretation (albeit statutory
interpretation to avoid a Charterviolation), the Court unanimously held
that the enactment of a mandatory sentence did not depart from a general
provision that the sentencing judge had the discretion to take into account
time already spent in custody when determining the sentence. Madame
Justice Arbour suggested that "[m]andatory minimum sentences are not the
norm in this country, and they depart from the general principles of
sentencing expressed in the Code," particularly the principle of
proportionality. 6 Not counting "dead time" against the mandatory
minimum sentence would result in disproportionately harsh sentences for
the "best offenders" caught by the mandatory minimum sentences. They
would be sentenced to the full four years whereas worse offenders

24 11995] 3 S.C.R. 44 [hereinafter Pontes].
25 [2000] 1 S.C.R. 455 [hereinafter lust].
26

Ib

at 466.
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sentenced to more than four years could receive credit (often at a 2:1 ratio)
for dead time spent in pre-trial custody. 27
F.

Morrisey28

In Morrisey, the Court returned to another of the mandatory fouryear sentences enacted in 1995 for offences involving firearms, this time
upholding the constitutionality of a mandatory minimum sentence of fouryears imprisonment for criminal negligence with a firearm causing death.
This was probably the most problematic of the ten mandatory sentences
enacted in 1995 because it applied to a person who was not necessarily
engaged in illegal activity and whose fault was entirely the product of
criminal negligence as opposed to intentional wrongdoing.
The actual facts of the case were reasonably sympathetic. The
offender, Mr. Marty Morrisey, was a thirty-five-year-old man with no prior
record, who lived with his mother and was very remorseful about the death
of his friend, the brother of his former girlfriend. He had overcome a
drinking problem, but began drinking after the break up of the relationship
with the victim's sister. He was extremely intoxicated when he fell off a
bunk bed causing a loaded firearm he was carrying to discharge into the
head of the victim.
Even more so than in Goltz, Mr. Justice Gonthier, for the majority
of the Court, focused on the gravity and nature of the offence in
determining whether the mandatory penalty was cruel and unusual. He
stressed that the accused would be convicted only if his conduct was
unreasonable, exhibited wanton and reckless disregard for human life or
safety, and constituted a marked departure from the standard of care
expected from those handling firearms. Given the crime, it was permissible
for Parliament to emphasize the sentencing goals of general deterrence,
denunciation, and retributive justice more than those of rehabilitation and
specific deterrence. This statement constitutes a different array of
sentencing goals than those expressed in Smith, where Mr. Justice Lamer
had defined the issue under section 12 as whether the sentence was grossly
disproportionate given the need "to punish, rehabilitate or deter this
particular offender or to protect the public from this particular offender." 9
There was little reason to think that four years in the penitentiary was

27

1bid. at 478-79.
Supra note 7.
29
Supra note 2 at 1074.
28
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necessary to deter or rehabilitate Morrisey, the remorseful first-time
offender. Nevertheless, the mandatory sentence was justified on the basis
that it was necessary to deter others from negligently using firearms and to
denounce and seek retribution for the crime.
In assessing the particular circumstances of the case and the effects
of punishment on the particular offender, Mr. Justice Gonthier examined
the aggravating and mitigating factors of the crime without much emphasis
on the offender's characteristics. The offender's remorse and lack of a
previous record was dismissed as typical of the non-intentional crime with
which he was charged. Mister Justice Gonthier also noted that the offender
would be eligible for day parole after ten months and full parole after
sixteen months, even though Mr. Justice Lamer in Smith had not
considered the availability of parole in mitigating the mandatory sentence
and had indicated that the duty of ensuring that sentences were
constitutional could not be delegated to prosecutors or anyone else. In this
case, more so than in Goltz, the Court's examination of the characteristics
of the offender and the circumstances of the particular crime was
dominated by its focus on the gravity of the offence.
.Morriseyrepresents an even greater departure from Smith in its
treatment of reasonable fiypothetical situations. The Court suggests that
the adjudicator is "to consider only those hypotheticals that could
reasonably arise"-in this case, deaths arising from playing with guns and
from hunting mishaps. A significant number of reported cases were
disqualified as reasonable hypotheticals because they were classified as
marginal,
extreme, or far-fetched possibilities as opposed to common
30
ones.
Madame Justice Arbour (Chief Justice MeLachlin concurring)
argued in a separate judgment that "real cases, representing situations that
have arisen, must be seen as reasonable hypotheticals for purposes of a s.
12 analysis, no matter how unusual they may appear."3 Relying on actual
cases, Madame Justice Arbour noted that the mandatory sentence could
have harsh effects on abused women, Aboriginal offenders, and police
officers who negligently caused deaths with a firearm. This insight, taken
from real cases, did not, however, cause Madame Justice Arbour to
conclude that the mandatory sentence should, as in Smith, be declared
unconstitutional because of the certainty that it would someday impose
cruel and unusual punishment. Instead, she concluded that at least for

3Mnorrise, supra note 7 at 18.
31 Ibid. at 30.
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broad manslaughter-like offences, the mandatory penalty should be upheld.
She hinted that courts in future cases might have to decline the application
of the mandatory sentence if it is grossly disproportionate to the particular
offender and crime.
The result was something quite close to American-style "as applied"
analysis defended by Mr. Justice McIntyre in Smith. Possibly
unconstitutional mandatory penalties could be upheld from facial
challenges, but subsequent courts could respond to exceptional cases
presumably by fashioning constitutional exemptions on a case-by-case
basis.' 2 Even those judges on the Court who were the most concerned about
the potentially harsh effects of the sentence were not prepared to strike it
down. Unlike Mr. Justice Lamer in Smith, they were prepared to wait for
an actual case where the application of the mandatory sentence would be
unconstitutional.
G.

3

Latimer

In Latimer, the Court upheld the mandatory minimum penalty of
life imprisonment with ten years ineligibility for parole as applied to Robert
Latimer. Latimer killed his daughter Tracy, a twelve-year-old girl who could
not communicate her wishes because of a severe form of cerebral palsy and
who required surgery to deal with the painful dislocation of her hip." The
Court restricted itself to the particular case and concluded that while "the
sentencing principles of rehabilitation, specific deterrence and protection
are not triggered for consideration, we are mindful of the important role
that the mandatory minimum sentence plays in denouncing murder"
particularly in cases where the offence is planned and "its consequences are
highly publicized, [so that] like-minded individuals may well be deterred by
severe sentences" and where the victim "is a vulnerable person with respect
to age, disability, or other similar factors."35 In this case, the Court placed

32 In combination with the Court's decision in R. v. Rose, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 262, this concurrence
suggests some implicit support for the use of constitutional exemptions not tied to a general declaration
of invalidity. It was thought that the Court would resolve this issue in Latimer,supra note 5, but it did
not. On the availability of constitutional exemptions see generally K. Roach, ConstitutionalRemedies
in Canada, looseleaf (Aurora: Canada Law Book, as updated) at 14,560ff.
33 Supra note
5.
34 The Supreme Court's full summary of the facts can be found at ibid. at 11-15.
The exact facts
of the case are a matter of some dispute beyond the scope of this paper, but are discussed in symposia
on the case in (2001) 39 C.R. (5th) 29ff; and (2001) 64 Sask. L Rev. 469ff.
35
Latimer,supra note 5 at 161.
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greater emphasis on general deterrence than it did in Smith, where it
stressed that considerations of general deterrence could not prevent
punishment from being cruel and unusual.
The Court emphasized that the offender's characteristics, the lack
of a need for public protection or rehabilitation, and the particular
circumstances of the case, including Latimer's motive to prevent his
daughter from undergoing painful surgery, did not displace the gravity of
the offence as measured by "an assessment of the criminal fault
requirement or mens rea element of the offence rather than the offender's
motive or general state of mind ...
[Tjhe mens rea requirement for second
degree murder is subjective foresight of death: the most serious level of
moral blameworthiness." The Court averted to controversy over the
wisdom of mandatory sentences "from a criminal la, policy or penological
point of view," but concluded that "the choice is Parliament's on the use of
minimum sentences." It also noted the possibility of the Royal Prerogative
of Mercy as "a matter for the executive, not the courts.2'' As was the case
in Lwaton, the Court could not kmow whether the sentence in this particular
case would be reduced sometime in the future by the executive.
III. THE SECTION 12 JURISPRUDENCE IN LIGHT OF
DEVELOPMENTS IN CHARTER REVIEW
This survey of cases suggests that the doctrine for determining
whether mandatory minimum sentences are constitutional has evolved
considerably since Smith. The Court is much more cautious about striking
down mandatory sentences on the basis of their effects on hypothetical
offenders. It is also more willing to defer to Parliament's decision to stress
some sentencing purposes over others, especially those related to societal
and victim interests in mandatory penalties. The Court is also placing
greater emphasis on the fault that must be proven before an offender is
convicted and sentenced under a mandatory minimum penalty. In this
section, I will explore how these changes are related to some broader shifts
in Charter review.
A.

From the Old Activism to the New Mininalism

As in other early decisions under the Charter,in Smith, the Court
extended itself to decide issues that could have been avoided. It would have

36 Ibid. at 159, 161.
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been easy for the Court to have followed the American practice of focusing
on whether a mandatory penalty was cruel and unusual as applied to the
facts of the particular case before it. Although Smith's sentence was
subsequently reduced from eight to six years in recognition of the changed
range of penalties, no one seriously contended that he was a small-time
importer or that the penalty in this case constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. Given the realities of both prosecutorial discretion and plea
bargaining, it might have taken forever for the perfect small-time
offender-the teenaged student coming home from Florida with a joint of
marijuana-to have appeared before the Court. Most small-time offenders
would not have been charged or would have quickly pleaded to the lesser
offence of possession of marijuana.
In the early years of the Charter,the Court was often inclined to
establish broad rules and guidelines to structure Charteradjudication. Smith
was a perfect example of this tendency. The Court accepted its
responsibility under the Charterand refused to delegate to prosecutors,
parole boards, or other members of the executive, the task of mitigating the
potential severity of the mandatory penalty. It was eager to underline that
the crucial issue under section 12 of the Charter was the effect of
punishment on the particular offender, and that Parliament's valid
legislative purposes in enacting mandatory penalties did not insulate them
from review. The Court's reliance on facial invalidation of the mandatory
penalty in Smith also reflected its preference for such blunt remedies in
other early Charter cases. It was reluctant to leave laws that were
potentially unconstitutional on the books because the legislature was better
suited to reconstructing or saving legislation,37 and because potentially
unconstitutional laws could cause harm. In the context of freedom of
expression, the Court explicitly recognized that potentially unconstitutional
legislation could chill legitimate expression."8 Similarly, a mandatory
minimum sentence could impose unfair pressure on the accused to plead
guilty to a lesser offence. Even if the hypothetical teenaged importer of a
joint in Smith would not have been convicted of importing, he or she might
have quickly and gratefully plead to the lesser offence of possession once

37 Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 169.
38
Rocket v. Royal Collegeof DentalSurgeonsof Ontario,[1990] 2 S.C.R. 232 at 251. More recently,
the Court has been less concerned about the ability of potentially unconstitutional laws to chill
legitimate expression. See for example: R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452; R. v. Sharpe, [2001) 1 S.C.R.
45.
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informed about the mandatory minimum penalty for importing and the
possibility of a conviction.
In Smith, the court stressed that utilitarian concerns about the
deterrence of others should only be considered under section 1 of the
Charter, where they would be held to exacting requirements of
proportionality focusing on the availability of less restrictive means to
achieve the objective. Mister Justice Lamer's dismissal of the state's case
under section 1 was typical of the early years of the Charteras he quickly
zeroed in on the availability of less restrictive means to deter the
importation of drugs by limiting the application of the mandatory sentence
to big-time offenders.
The Court subsequently diluted the strict proportionality
requirements of R. v. Oakes39 and the criminal law was not immune to such
trends. By 1992, for example, the Court was willing to accept that a reverse
onus on bail should be applied even to small-time offenders accused of
importing or trafficking narcotics.4 The Court's section 12 decisions after
Smith reflect a more general deferential turn in its approach to the Charter
both outside and within the criminal law.
One vehicle for deference available to the Court was to emulate the
practice of U.S. courts where constitutional decisions were avoided (the
passive virtues) or their ambit was minimized (constitutional minimalism).
Alexander Bickel and Cass Sunstein4" defend these techniques as
approaches for minimizing the risk of judicial error and madmizing
legislative options in a system based on judicial supremacy. Although these
techniques are not without their Canadian supporters,4 they are generally
unnecessary and even inadvisable in Canada. Under the Charter,courts can
make bolder and broader decisions about the ambit of rights without

39 [19861 S.C.R. 103. On this period of Charter rczcw and signs of its decline see
D, Beatty,
Talking Headsandthe Suprenzes- The CanadianProductiontfCensituttanalkRe toe, (Toronto- Cars-.,cll,

1990).

40

R. v. Pearson,[1992 3 S.C.R. 665.
On the passive virtues of avoiding constitutional decisions by engaging in statutory

interpretation and other methods, see A. Bickel, The Lcast DangcrousBrancic TheSupcre Caurtatthe

BarofPolftics, 2d ed., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19,6) c. 4. On constitutional mawmah-cm as
advocated by Sunstein, see supranote S.

42P. Monahan, "The Supreme Court in the 21st Centur" (2-101) N0Can- Bar Rev. 374 at 39M.
and F.L Morton & R. Knopff, CharterPolitics(Toronto. Nelson, 1992) at I5ff For an elabration of
my own views about why constitutional minimalism is not necesasy under the Charter,see K, Roach.
The Supreme Courton TriabJudicialActivism or Democratc Dtalo.-ue?(Toronto: lrv in La.w, 2Iij3 1) at
147-52 [hereinafter The Supreme Court on Taln.
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usurping the ability of legislatures to justify contextual departures from the
Court's principles under section 1. The Court's bold decision in Smith was
not necessarily the last word on the use of mandatory penalties for
importing narcotics, as Parliament could have enacted a better-tailored
mandatory penalty. Mister Justice Lamer specifically averted to this option
when he discussed the less drastic alternative of a mandatory sentence that
would only apply to repeat offenders or those who imported large
quantities of narcotics.4 3
Although the Court has not rejected reliance on reasonable
examples under section 12 of the Charter,it has been less imaginative in
conjuring them up. In Goltz, Mr. Justice Gonthier held that the reasonable
example must not be far-fetched. He dealt primarily with the case before
him, which involved a person who drove knowing his license had been
suspended due to his bad driving record. In her dissent, Madame Justice
McLachlin, with the concurrence of Chief Justice Lamer, accused the
majority of reading down or sanctioning exemptions from the mandatory
penalty by examining only a subset of cases in which the mandatory penalty
applied. Madame Justice McLachlin was concerned that the logical
implication of the majority's approach was that "no law need be found to
offend the Charter. The law is declared valid; it is only some of its
applications that are invalid." Relying on "case-by-case adjudication by
judges would be to deprive people of knowing in advance what the law is"
when the "preferable approach is to confront squarely the question of the
extent to which a law is inconsistent with the Charter and hence invalid
under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.""4 True to Madame Justice
McLachlin's predictions, the Court was required to revisit the seven-day
mandatory penalty four years later in Pontes. In that case, it decided an
issue-the unconstitutionality of the mandatory penalty of imprisonment
for an absolute liability offence-that could have been decided in Goltz.
The Court's minimalism in Goltz resulted in an incremental, case-by-case
approach, that necessitated the subsequent decision in Pontes.
Recent decisions suggest that the Court is increasingly attracted to
the techniques of passive virtues and constitutional minimalism. In Wust,

43 It is possible that even a better tailored mandatory sentence could constitute cruel and unusual
punishment when applied to exceptional offenders such as a reluctant and peripheral offender or 'drug
mule' who, subject to pressure short of duress, imported large quantities of narcotics. In such a case,
the appropriate judicial response would be to uphold the mandatory sentence and to craft a
constitutional exemption from it for the exceptional offender. I am grateful to an anonymous referee
for bringing this scenario to my attention.
44 Goltz, supra note 6 at 511-12.
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it avoided the constitutional issue by relying on statutory interpretation to
hold that mandatory sentences could be reduced by deadtime. Interpreting
a statute so as to avoid a constitutional violation is a classical use of the
passive virtues as advocated by Bickel. Such a judicial approach makes it
easier for the legislature to respond to the Court's judgment than if the
Court decided the case on constitutional grounds. The problem in the
Canadian context, however, is that the legislature can respond even to a
constitutionaljudgment with ordinary legislation that limits or overrides the
constitutional right declared by the Court. In Latimer,the Court decided only whether the penalty was cruel
and unusual as applied to the defendant and not the broader issue of
whether the mandatory penalty for second degree murder should be struck
down or could be unconstitutional when applied to other murder cases,
including those in which the victim consented to his or her death. This is a
classic example of the minimalism involved in "as applied" analysis that
only examines the particular facts of the case.
In Morisey, the Court warned that reasonable hypotheticals must
be based on common applications of the mandatory penalty and refused to
consider actual cases in which the mandatory penalty of four-years
imprisonment for unlawful homicide with a firearm would have been
applied to battered women, Aboriginal offenders, and police officers. The
focus on commonly occurring examples meant that little attention was paid
to the range of different personal circumstances of the offender that could
be caught by the mandatory penalty, unlike in Smith, where the use of a
teenaged student as a hypothetical offender loomed large. Madame Justice
Arbour (with the concurrence of Chief Justice McLachlin) argued that the
Court should not ignore these real cases. Hovever, even this case followed
the trajectory of constitutional minimalism by holding that the mandatory
penalty should be upheld despite the possibility, as represented by real
reported cases, that it might be unconstitutional.
The trend towards examining the effects of the penalty in the case
at hand, perhaps supplemented by commonly occurring examples, makes
life more difficult for defence lawyers by forcing them to defend the
injustice of applying the penalty to their particular offender. In Morrisey,
the Court was not impressed with the offender's remorse, lack of prior
record, or struggle with alcohol, and noted that the family of the victim

On the similarities between the common law and the Charter in this rcsp2ct see IK Reach,
"Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Betw.een the Supreme Court and Canadian Legtslatures"
(2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 4S1 [hereinafter "Dialogues"]
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feared him. Likewise, with respect to Latimer, the Court noted his "initial
attempts to conceal his actions, his lack of remorse, his position of trust, the
significant degree of planning and premeditation, and Tracy's extreme
vulnerability"46 as aggravating factors that helped justify the penalty. Most
real offenders, as opposed to hypothetical ones, will have some
characteristics commonly considered to be aggravating factors. Moriseyand
Latimer suggest that the Supreme Court will not be shy about identifying
these factors and using them as a partial justification for the mandatory
sentence.
When the Court did consider hypothetical offenders in Morrisey,it
did so in a manner that did not account for the variety of personal
characteristics that might have applied to offenders, especially
characteristics that relate to the specific deterrence and rehabilitation of
the hypothetical offender in the future. The Court concluded that the fouryear mandatory penalty was not grossly disproportionate when dealing with
the common examples of offenders who played with guns or accidentally
shot someone on a hunting trip. The Court ignored the possibility that
some of these offenders might have personal characteristics such as youth,
old age, illness, past abuse, Aboriginal heritage, disadvantaged background,
remorse, or habitual and non-controllable factors that did not produce an
incapacity to appreciate the risk,47 which, arguably, should affect the
sentence and even the constitutionality of the mandatory sentence.
The Court also ignored the variety of circumstances (intoxication,
pressure not caught by the duress defence, mental disorder not caught by
the mental disorder defence, successful attempts at rehabilitation, or
reparation since the crime) under which these common hypothetical crimes
could occur. Exceptional circumstances relating to particular offenders and
offences are, unfortunately, not caught by the generic notion of commonly
occurring examples. In short, the Court's diminished enthusiasm for relying
on hypothetical examples makes it more difficult than it was in Smith to
have mandatory penalties struck down on the basis of the injustice they
could cause to the best possible offender.

46

Supra note 5 at 160.
47 These are factors that would not be considered under the objective standard of
liability
articulated by the majority in R. v. Creighton, [1993) 3. S.C.R. 3.
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Balancing the Rights of the Accused with those of Society and Victims

At the time of its decision in Smith, the Court conceived of criminal
justice issues through the bipolar lens of due process. On one side was the
accused in possession of legal rights and on the other was society with
legitimate interests based on section 1 of the Charter.In Smith, Mr. Justice
Lamer stressed that in interpreting section 12 of the Charter,the Court
should focus on the effects of the mandatory penalty on particular
offenders. According to him, society's interests in deterring the importation
of narcotics should only be considered under section 1 where they would be
held to a strict proportionality analysis. Perhaps because drugs were
thought to be a "victimless" or, at least, a consensual crime, there vas no
consideration of the interests of people who might be harmed by the
importation and distribution of cocaine.
The Court no longer relies exclusively on the due process logic of
Smith and many of its other early Charterdecisions. Rather, the Court has
applied more deferential section 1 tests to a number of criminal justice
issues and has committed itself to defining the rights of the accused, and
equality and security rights of victims or potential victims of crime, in a
relational fashion that reconciles competing rights. Chief Justice
McLachlin, who once insisted on the strict due process paradigm in her
decisions in Seaboyer4" and Keegstra,4 now recognizes that although "the
criminal law is generally seen as involving a contest between the state and
the accused ... it also involves an allocation of priorities between the
accused and the victim, actual or potential." r
The interests of the state in convicting and punishing offenders have
been augmented in Parliament and in the Court by the rights of victims.,'
On the surface, this change in the law and politics of the Charterand in
criminal justice would seem not to have any application to the section 12
cases discussed above. Since Smith, the Court has not even reached a
section 1 analysis because it has held that every mandatory penalty
challenged has not been cruel and unusual punishment. Nor has it needed

4SR. v. Seabqyer, [ 1991] 2 S.C.R. 577.
49

R. v. Keegstra, [19901 3 S.CR. 697.

.50 RI
51

Macdonald v. Canada,[199513 S.C.R. 199 at 33.
See generally K. Roach, DueProcess and I ncims'
kgjhts: The N w Law andPofrtcs of Cammal

Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1999) descnbing a punitive 'wtims' rights mvlel of
criminal justice in which disadvantaged groups are offered criminal justice reforms in rcFsF.njm to
concerns that they suffer inequality and insecurity.
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to apply a more deferential test of justification designed to recognize
Parliament's role in reconciling competing interests or rights. Even in
Latimer, the Court did not explicitly apply a relational approach that
defined (and at the margins limited) the accused's rights under section 12
with the life, security, and equality rights claimed by intervenors
representing the disabled community and pro-life groups.
There are signs, however, that the section 12jurisprudence has not
been immune from the Court's increased recognition of social and victim
interests in criminal sanctions, or from Parliament's willingness to assert
those interests in a punitive manner. In Luxton, the Court relied on the
notion that the illegal domination of the victim by the accused was a theme
central to the crime of first degree murder. The Court regarded the
mandatory penalty as part of "society's condemnation of a person who has
exploited a position ofpower and dominance to the greatest extent possible
by murdering the person he or she is forcibly confining."' 2 In response to
well-publicized cases involving very sympathetic victims, Parliament
subsequently added to the list of underlying offences that result in a first
degree murder conviction in order to provide protection for victims of
criminal harassment and criminal organization offences in subsections
231(6) and 231(6.1) of the Code.53 There have also been calls from
commentators to expand the section further to include other victims,
including victims of hate crimes and domestic violence.'
Concerns about victims have not been limited to the context of
murder. In Goltz,55 the Court took note of the social costs of traffic
accidents, the disproportionate involvement of bad drivers in traffic
accidents, and the social interests and difficulties in deterring bad drivers
from driving. In Morrisey,16 the Court upheld a mandatory penalty enacted

52

Luxton,supra note 4 at 724.

53 S.C. 1997, c. 16, s. 3; and S.C. 1997,
c. 23, s. 8.
54 1. Grant, D. Chunn & C. Boyle, The Law of Homicide, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell,
1994) at
7-28. They conclude that mandatory life sentences for murder should be retained with ineligibility for
parole "to reflect our outrage at Canada's most serious crime." Ibid. at 7-55, 7-56.
55
Supra note 6 at 508-09.
56

Supra note 7 at 121. The threshold of social costs seems to be getting lower. In Goltz,supra
note
6 at 509, Mr. Justice Gonthier noted that 622 persons had been killed in traffic accidents in British
Columbia in one year whereas in Morrisey, supra note 7 at 117, he observes that "[iln 1995 alone, there
were 49 'accidents' causing death involving firearms, coupled with 145 homicidal deaths involving
firearms." In both cases, the implicit assumption must be that without mandatory sentences the death
toll may have been higher. This assumption is not generally supported by deterrence theory or empirical
studies of deterrence, which suggest that increasing the severity of punishment alone does not deter

2001]

Searchingfor Smith: The Constitutionalityof MUS

3S9

as part of gun control legislation in the wake of the massacre of fourteen
women at Montreal's Ecole Polytechnique. It took note of the social costs
of non-intentional firearm deaths and held that Parliament was entitled to
stress deterrence and denunciation of firearm offences and to provide
"retributive justice to the family of the victim and the community in
general." There are suggestions in Morisey that, contrary to Smith,
Parliament's concern about using mandatory sentences to deter people
other than the particular offender may be a legitimate consideration in
determining whether the mandatory sentence violates section 12 of the
CharterY This suggestion became clearer in Latimer, where the Court
noted that in cases of planned and highly publicized crimes "where the
victim is a vulnerable person with respect to age, disability, or other similar
factors," it may be necessary to ensure that "like-minded individuals may
well be deterred by severe sentences." A concern about crime victims,
including crime victims from section 15 groups, has been invoked as a
justification for mandatory sentences. Victims' rights have also been used
to justify the punitive crime control response embodied in mandatory
penalties.
The association of mandatory penalties with a punitive victims'
rights agenda is unfortunate. There is little evdence to support the hope
that mandatory penalties of imprisonment, which may not even be mom
by the general public, will serve as effective deterrents of crimes committed
against vulnerable people. Even vthout the blunt instrument of a
mandatory penalty, paragraph 718.2(a) of the Code already deems hatred
on section 15 grounds, spousal or child abuse, or other abuses of a position
of trust and authority, as aggravating factors in sentencing. The focus on
equal protection of the criminal law in politically-charged cases such as
Latimer, often proceeds on exaggerated assumptions about the extent of
protection that the criminal law actually provides. Mandatory sentences

crime. Nevertheless, a focus on the incidence ofvictimization as ajustihcaton for the criminal -anction
reflects a "risk society" in which it is easier to calculate ruk than reduce it. For an argument that
empirical studies do justify the mandatory prohibitions on dining that are imp lced as a result of drunk
driving convictions, see E. Chamberlain & R. Solomon, "."dtsplaccd S:,mpathres: W hy Driwn,"
Prohibitions Are Neither Cruel-Nor Unusual" (2001) 45 Crim. LQ. 331.
57 'While recognizing, as in Smith, that "general deterrence cannot, on its oW-*n,
pree.nt a
punishment from being cruel and unusual," Justice Gonthier also notes that "the pumshment is
acceptable under s. 12 while having a strong and salutoiy effect of general deterrence. It cannot b2
disputed that there is a need for general deterrence. This legitiatton dictates that thos ?-.ho p:ck up a
gun must exercise care when handling it." Supra note 7 at 117.
5S Supra note 5 at 41, quoting R. v. Ahrahdl (1993L.21 B.CA.C 296
at 3Kt
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may be defended in the often vain and, at best, uncertain hope that they
will provide protection for various disadvantaged groups that are subject to
disproportionate victimization. However, they will also result in injustice
when applied to exceptional offenders, including exceptional offenders with
the same characteristics as the disadvantaged group that is supposed to be
protected by the mandatory penalty. The dichotomy between victims and
offenders that drives many punitive forms of victims' rights often breaks
down in practice and individuals such as women, the young, Aboriginal
people, the disabled, and other vulnerable minorities who are thought to be
protected by mandatory sentences may also be caught by them.
C.

The Interactionof Faultand Penalty

A final broad trend in the section 12 jurisprudence as it affects
mandatory sentences is the Court's increased emphasis on the gravity of the
offence as measured by the fault that must be proven to convict the
accused. In Smith, the Court did not discuss the mens rea requirement of
importing narcotics. It did not discuss the fact that the mens rea
requirement would protect a person who honestly believed that he or she
was bringing a substance other than illegal drugs across the border. The
hypothetical offender that the Court relied upon presumably knew that he
or she was bringing a joint into Canada. In subsequent cases, however, the
Court has placed greater emphasis on the accused's fault-especially
constitutionally-mandated standards of fault-as a justification for the
mandatory penalty.
In Goltz,' Mr. Justice Gonthier stressed that the mandatory penalty
of seven-days imprisonment was being upheld only for the offence of
knowingly driving while prohibited, and the mens rea requirement made it
"a graver offence ... than would be an offence of driving while unaware of
a prohibition." The Court backed up this observation four years later in
Pontes,when it held that a person convicted of an absolute liability offence
of driving while prohibited could not constitutionally be subject to the
mandatory seven-days imprisonment. This harkened back to Madame
Justice Wilson's conclusion in the Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor
Vehicle Act61 that imprisonment was not a sentence proportionate to the

seriousness of an absolute liability offence committed without subjective or

59

R. v. Beaver, [19571 S.C.R. 531.

60

Supra note 6 at 507.

61 f1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 533-34.
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objective fault. A focus on the absence of fault in absolute liability offences
has restrained the use of mandatory imprisonment.
The Court's more recent decision in Morrisey, however, suggests
that aside from no-fault absolute liability, a focus on fault may not restrain
the use of mandatory imprisonment. The Court simply remarked that the
offence of criminal negligence causing death was "not an absolute liability
offence. It requires proof of conduct which is such a marked departure
from the behaviour of a reasonably prudent person as to show a wanton or
reckless disregard for the life or safety of others." 2The Court's increased
acceptance of a non-individuated standard of objective fault not related to
the prohibited act as a constitutionally appropriate fault standard under
section 7 of the Charter,has influenced its section 12 decisions.
This reliance on non-individuated standards of fault can have
unfortunate and harsh consequences. One of the reasons given in R. v.
Creighton63 for the acceptance of such a broad and non-individuated
standard of criminal liability was that trial judges could use their sentencing
discretion to tailor the penalty to the circumstances of a broad
manslaughter offence that covered near accidents as w.ell as near murders.
This discretion could also consider personal characteristics of the offender
that were held by the majority to be irrelevant in determining liability. The
ability of sentencing discretion to mitigate overly broad and harsh liability
standards could quickly be eliminated if Parliament decided to enact a
mandatory minimum sentence. As Madame Justice Arbour observes, "prior
to the [19951 Firearms Act amendments imposing mandatory minimum
punishments for manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death with
a firearm, this Court recognized the importance offlexibility in determining
the appropriate sentence for the offence of manslaughter.""
This flexible approach is no longer applied when manslaughter is
committed with a firearm. Now, a trial judge must sentence the offender to
at least four-years imprisonment regardless of the circumstances of the
offence, the offender's age, health, or other personal characteristics. This
approach is a recipe for injustice and harshness. The sentencing discretion

62 Supra note 7 at 105.

V3 [19 93] 3. S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Creighton].The standard of negligence accepted by the nasonrty
in that case rejects the relevance of offender characteristics such as age, gender, or other per-onal
characteristics unless that characteristic renders the accused incapable f appreciating the nr of n ntrivial bodily harm. Madame Justice McLachhn concluded for the majority that"lack of educattn and

psychological predispositions serwe as no excuse for criminal cimduct, although the may be imrIrtant
factors to consider in sentencing." Ibid. at 70.
64 Morrisev, supra note 7 at

117.
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relied upon by the Court in Creighton has been severely curtailed by the
mandatory sentences enacted by Parliament less than two years after the
Court's oft-criticized decision in that case. In making decisions about
standards of liability and the ambit of defences in substantive criminal law,
judges should be cautious about assuming that sentencing discretion will be
available to mitigate the potentially harsh effects of their rulings. If the
Court had known that mandatory minimum sentences were imminent, it
might have adopted the stronger mens rea requirement defended in dissent
by Mr. Justice Lamer in Creighton. This approach required objective
foresight of risk to life, not just a risk of bodily harm, and allowed some
offender characteristics to influence the standard of reasonable conduct.
Unfortunately, it is probably too late to reverse Creighton, even though
people convicted of negligent manslaughter with a gun will now be subject
to a mandatory minimum of four-years imprisonment that was not in place
at the time of the Supreme Court's decision.
The hard lessons of the unanticipated consequences of subsequent
Parliamentary intervention are not limited to the manslaughter context.
The Court's decision in Luxton to uphold the sentence of life imprisonment
with no eligibility for parole for twenty-five years was based on two
assumptions: that first degree murderers would only be convicted for crimes
based on illegal domination of the victim, and that they could apply to a
jury to be declared eligible for parole after serving fifteen years. Both of
these facts, however, have subsequently been altered by Parliament. In
response to particular crimes, Parliament has added criminal harassment
and criminal organization offences to the list of underlying offences for
constructive first degree murder. This list of crimes is likely to increase in
the future as Parliament responds to terrible and well-publicized crimes.65
In addition, Parliament has reduced the likelihood that first degree
murderers will be declared eligible for parole in "faint hope hearings" in a
variety of ways.66 Consequently, the Court should be prepared to revisit its
prior precedents in light of these legislative changes. Moreover, it should

65 Bill C-36 proposes that killings during terrorist activities be added to first degree murder. See
K. Roach, "The Dangers of a Charter-Proofand Crime-Based Response to Terrorism" in R. Daniels,
P. Macklem & K. Roach, eds., The Security of Freedom:Essays on Canada'sAnti-Terrorisn Bill (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2001) 139.
66 In response to Clifford Olson's failed faint hope application, multiple murderers have been
excluded, applications are screened, the jury must be unanimous and victim impact statements are now
admissible at faint hope hearings. See J.V. Roberts & D.P. Cole, "Sentencing and Early Release
Arrangements for Offenders Convicted of Murder" in J.V. Roberts & D.P. Cole, eds., Making Sense of
Sentencing (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) 277 at 289ff.

2001]

Searchingfor Smith: The Constitutionaityof MMS

not justify its decisions about criminal fault and cruel and unusual
punishment on the assumption that any injustice or harshness can be cured
by the benevolent exercise of discretion-discretion that may not be
exercised in any individual case and that may be removed by Parliament
altogether.
The Court's decisions in Lrton and Latimer to uphold mandatory
life imprisonment for murder are good examples of how mens rea
requirements have been used to justify mandatory penalties. One of the
reasons given by Chief Justice Lamer for upholding the mandatory
minimum penalty in Luxton was that it was no longer possible "to classify
unintentional killings as first degree murder."'67 The offence of first-degree
murder ensured that the offender would have an added degree of fault.
This added degree of fault included an assessment of the deliberation
involved in the killing, knowledge that the person being killed was a police
officer or prison guard, or the commission of a very serious underlying
offence involving the illegal domination of the victim.
In Latimer," the Court made it clear that subjective foresight of
death was sufficient to justify life imprisonment with ineligibility for parole
for ten years. It stated that "in considering the character of Mr. Latimer's
actions, we are directed to an assessment of the criminal fault requirement
or mens rea element of the offence rather than the offender's motive or
general state of mind." Just as it is irrelevant to determining criminal
liability, motive is considered by the Court to be irrelevant in determining
whether mandatory life imprisonment is cruel and unusual punishment for
murder. This approach could mean that a person who knowingly but
compassionately kills a relative, spouse, or friend who requests assistance
in ending his or her life in order to relieve suffering could be subject to the
mandatory penalty. The accused's motive would be irrelevant to assessing
the gravity of their offence. Similarly, an accused who knowingly killed
another person because their child was threatened would, absent a duress
defence precluded by section 17 of the Code, also be subject to the
mandatory penalty. Again, the offender's motive would be irrelevant to the
gravity of the offence. The same result would be true of an accused who

67
6

Supra note 4 at 720-21.

S Supra note 5 at 39.
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killed because of a genuine but unreasonable fear that his or her life was
threatened. 69
In all of the cases since Smith, the Court has relied heavily on the
fault required for a conviction as a justification for mandatory sentences.
In Pontes, a focus on fault led to the implicit invalidation of a mandatory
sentence of imprisonment for absolute liability offences. By contrast, the
presence of subjective fault in Luxton, Latimer, and Goltz and of objective
fault inMorrisey,helped justify the mandatory penalties. The use of fault in
Luxton and Latimer also lends some support to the idea that due process,
in the form of constitutionally-required fault, can be used to justify crime
control in the form of mandatory life imprisonment."
The Court's relaxation of constitutionally-required fault standards
is also reflected in its section 12jurisprudence. In its 1991 decision in Goltz,
the Court indicated that the offender's subjective knowledge of the
prohibited act-driving with a prohibited license-helped justify a
mandatory minimum of seven-days imprisonment. By contrast, in 2000 the
Court accepted a non-individuated standard of objective foresight of
threats to safety as not being incompatible with a mandatory minimum of
four-years imprisonment for manslaughter committed with a firearm. It is
becoming easier to justify mandatory sentences on the basis of less onerous
fault requirements, even for serious offences that carry significant
mandatory terms of imprisonment.
Trends in constitutional law help explain the Court's evolving
jurisprudence on the constitutionality ofmandatory penalties. These trends
include the Court's increased attraction to constitutional minimalism and
increased- reluctance to strike down mandatory penalties on the basis of
their possible application to hypothetical offenders. The Court is also more
prepared to defer to attempts by Parliament to protect people who may be
vulnerable to being victimized by crime. Finally, and as will be suggested in
the next part of this article, the Court's increased focus on the offender's
fault as a justification for mandatory penalties also dovetails with
developments in sentencing since Smith that emphasize punishment as a
deserved response to crime without regard to whether punishment is
required for rehabilitation or for public protection.

69 These hypothetical examples were included in the CcLA's factum in Latimer.See
Latirner,supra
note 5 (Intervenor's factum at paras. 16-20). If faced with such cases, the Court could distinguish
Latimergiven its decision to restrict itself to the facts of that case. See supra note 5 at 38-39.
70 On the idea that due process can help legitimize crime control, see D. McBarnet, Conviction:
Law, the State and the Construction of Justice (London: Macmillan, 1981); and RN, Ericson & P
Baranek, The Ordering of Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982).
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IV. THE SECTION 12 JURISPRUDENCE IN LIGHT OF
DEVELOPMENTS IN SENTENCING
Changes in sentencing since the 1987 decision in Smith have been
as dramatic as the changes in constitutional law. This section explores how
some of these changes have been reflected in the Court's post-Smith
decisions concerning the constitutionality of mandatory sentences and, in
particular, its increased focus on the gravity of the offence as measured by
the offender's fault, its increased concern about maintaining desert-based
proportionality, and its increased acceptance of the ability of Parliament to
emphasize the punitive purposes of sentencing by enacting mandatory
sentences.
A.

IncreasedEmphasison Just Deserts

The most important post-Smith development in sentencing has been
Bill C-41, which codified the purposes and principles of sentencing in 1996.
Although Parliament did not go as far as American "just deserts" reforms
and sentencing grids, or even the more moderate proposals of the Canadian
Sentencing Commission, the 1996 reforms, as exemplified by subsection
718.1 of the Code, recognized that the fundamental principle of sentencing
was that "a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence
and the degree of responsibility of the offender.""' This approach gave
pride of place to the idea that punishment was both justified and limited by
what is deserved for the crime. As the Court explained in 1996: "It is a wellestablished tenet of our criminal law that the quantum of sentence imposed
should be broadly commensurate with the gravity of the offence committed
and the moral blameworthiness of the offender."7The idea that just deserts both justifies and limits punishment has
contradictory attractions. Some commentators stress the idea ofjust deserts
as a limit on punishment, particularly punishment paternalistically imposed
for the offender's own good or in the hope of deterring crime. Others stress
the idea of just deserts as a justification for punishment, a calculated
infliction of hard treatment to respond to the wickedness of crime and a
release from the need to demonstrate that punishment serves some
instrumental or utilitarian good. Whether just deserts limits or justifies
punishment depends on context and politics.

71 S.C.1995, c. 22, s. 6.
72A (CA.), supra note 9 at
529.
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In Smith, the Court showed little attraction to a just deserts
approach to sentencing. Mister Justice Lamer defined the issue as not
simply what punishment was deserved for the particular crime, but what
punishment was necessary to deter or to rehabilitate the particular offender
given his or her personal characteristics. Smith reflected the sentencing
philosophy of the 1969 Ouimet Report,73 which stressed the need to justify
punishment in relation to rehabilitation and deterrence more than it
stressed the retributive focus of the 1987 report of the Canadian Sentencing
Commission.74 The notion that just deserts could limit punishment was, at
most, incipient in Smith.' It appeared to be scuttled when the Court
upheld indeterminate detention for dangerous offenders, disregarding Mr.
Justice Estey's dissent that such punishment exceeded the gravity of the
crime. The Court's concerns with deterrence and rehabilitation led it to
strike down the mandatory sentence in that case. That same year these
same concerns led the Court to uphold provisions that imposed
indeterminate imprisonment on dangerous offenders.
In subsequent years, however, the Court has placed increased
emphasis on just deserts as both a limit on, and a justification for
punishment. In 1995, the Court held in Pontes that a person could not be
imprisoned for an absolute liability offence committed without subjective
or objective fault. Imprisonment was not an appropriate response to a nofault offence. One year later, the Court recognized retribution as a
legitimate component of punishment and distinguished it from vengeance
on the basis that retributive punishment was linked in a calculated manner
to the offender's moral culpability and mens rea.76 The retributive idea of
desert as a limit on punishment can be seen in these cases. The sentence is
limited by not only the gravity of the crime committed by the offender, but
also by the offender's degree of moral responsibility or moral culpability.
However, Pontesis the only Supreme Court case in which desert ideas have

73 Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, Towards Unity: Criminal
Justice and
Corrections (Ottawa: Supply & Services, 1969) at 185.
74Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach (Ottawa:
Supply
& Services, 1987) [hereinafter Sentencing Reform]. At the time Smith was argued, there were still a

number of precedents on the books that suggested that retribution should be rejected as vengeance in
disguise. SeeR v.Hinch andSalanski (1967), 62 W.W.R. 205 (B.C. C.A.); and R. v. Morrissette(1970),
75 W.W.R. 644 (Sask. C.A.).
75 This argument is elaborated upon in K. Roach, "Smith and the Supreme Court: Implications
for Sentencing Policy and Reform" (1989) 11 S.C.L.R. 433.
76 M (C.A.), supra note 9.
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actually been used to limit punishment. In other cases, the Court has
focused on desert and culpability as a justification for punishment.
The Court relied on the constitutional requirement of subjective
fault and subjective foresight of death for a murder conviction to justify
mandatory life imprisonment in both Lluxton and Latimer.In Luxton., the
Court stressed the "proportionality between the moral turpitude of the
offender and the malignity of the offence." In that case the offence was
defined as one that involved the continued illegal domination of the victim.
In Latimer, the Court stressed "the important role that the mandatory
minimum sentence plays in denouncing murder,", which, it noted, is one
of the purposes of sentencing in section 718 of the Code. It defines
denunciation as "a symbolic, collective statement that the offender's
conduct should be punished for encroaching on our society's basic code of
values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law." Denunciation
focuses on the gravity of the offence committed without regard to the moral
responsibility of the offender.
The notion that a mandatory penalty may be a deserved response
to an offence is also apparent in the Court's decision to uphold mandatory
sentences for crimes that are less serious than murder. In Goltz, the Court
stressed the contempt for the law that is demonstrated by a driver who
knowingly drives while prohibited. In this case, a mandatory penalty of
seven-days imprisonment was justified, in large part, on the basis of the
offender's subjective fault and contempt for the law.
Even though the conduct was unintentional and the fault was
objective and not necessarily related to the prohibited act, in Morrisej', the
Court also employed the rhetoric of just deserts and proportionality, as
measured by the gravity of the crime and the offender's degree of
responsibility. Mister Justice Gonthier stressed that:
although less morally blameworthy than murder, criminal negligence causin3 death i still
morally culpable behaviour that warrants a resronse by Parliament dictating that v, anton or
reckless disregard for life and safety of others is simply nt acceptable ... [the "_entence
represents society's denunciation, having regard to the gravity of the crime; it prnx.ies
retributive justice to the family of the victim and the community in general- and it '2res a
general deterrent function to prevent others from acting so rechlesly in the future-

77Supra note 4 at 712.
78
Supra note 5 at 41.
79

Supra note 7 at 118, 121. The Court's reference to pro~tding rctnbutive justice to thev
itam's
family is also at odds vith the Court's decisions in Gladuesupranote 10, and in F tt,sut r note 10,

which suggest that acknowledgement and reparation of harms suffered by vctims are rc Viorati-.e
principles of sentencing that are not associated with the u'ie of pnson.
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The fact that the Court upheld the four-year mandatory minimum
sentence for one of the least blameworthy crimes covered by the mandatory
sentences enacted in 1995 for firearm offences, 80 suggests that the Court's
understanding of proportionality and desert may not serve as an effective
limit on mandatory sentences.
This use of just deserts to justify mandatory sentences is not
inevitable. The Canadian Sentencing Commission recommended the repeal
of all mandatory sentences, other than for murder, on the just deserts
grounds that "if the punishment is to fit the crime, then there can be no
predetermined sentences since criminal events are not themselves predetermined. Although the offence should be the focus in determining the
appropriate penalty, the circumstances of the offender must also have some
weight."8 ' In both Luxton and Morrisey, the reliance on the possibility that
offenders might have their sentence mitigated by parole, and in Latimer,
the reliance on the possibility of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy,
undermines the just deserts ideas that: 1) determinate punishment should
be calculated on what is deserved for past crimes; and 2) that it is unjust to
punish a person on the basis of what might happen in the future. The Court
might, sometime in the future, return to the idea that was incipient in
Smith, implicit in Pontes, and explicit in section 718.1 of the Code-that
mandatory penalties are disproportionate to the gravity of a crime and to
an offender's degree of responsibility-and respond by striking them down.
Indeed, in obiter in Wust, 82 Madame Justice Arbour suggested that
mandatory sentences "often detract from what Parliament has expressed as
the fundamental principle of sentencing in s.718.1 of the Code: the principle
of proportionality."
Morrisey presented a wonderful opportunity to demonstrate that
desert not only justifies, but limits punishment. A mandatory minimum
term of four-years imprisonment for manslaughter seems harsh in
comparison to an offender's fault which only requires objective foresight of
threats to bodily harm and safety. Unfortunately, the opportunity to
demonstrate that punishment was limited by desert and fault was lost in
Morrisey and the Court may have difficulty finding another opportunity.

soThe

four-year mandatory sentence for offences committed with firearms also applies to
attempted murder, causing bodily harm with intent to wound, sexual assault, aggravated assault,
kidnapping, hostage taking, robbery, and extortion. Although the consequences of these offences are
not as severe as manslaughter, they are generally committed with a higher level of subjective and
intentional fault and often involve the illegal domination of the victim.
SentencingReform, supra note 74 at 186.
82

Supra note 25 at 466.
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In recent cases such as Morrisey and Latimer, the Court's focus on
the gravity of the crime, the offender's responsibility for the offence as
measured by mens rea, and the need to denounce crimes and punish them
proportionately, has been used to justify mandatory sentences. This focus
has encouraged the Court to place less emphasis on offender characteristics
and what is necessary to deter or rehabilitate a particular offender. One
searches the recent cases in vain for Smith's emphasis of offender
characteristics and gross disproportionality when considered in light of
what is necessary for deterrence or rehabilitation of the particular offender.
One explanation for this is the increasing emphasis that Parliament and the
Court have placed on just deserts as measured by the abstract denunciation
of crimes and the responsibility of the offender for the crime as measured
by mens rea.
B.

Tying to Maintain Proportionalityin the Face ofMandatory
Sentences

Mandatory sentences are part of a statutory framework that
proclaims proportionality as its first principle. This framework suggests that
the Court should make sense of constitutional mandatory sentences so as
to maintain proportionality between offences and among different crimes
that fall within that same offence. There are some signs that the Court, and
especially Madame Justice Arbour, are attentive to this obligation. In most
cases, the increased emphasis on proportionality will require sentences to
be ratcheted up to account for the hard fact that the best offender and least
serious version of the crime is caught by the mandatory minimum penalty.
In a few cases, a concern about maintaining proportionality has led to a less
punitive response.
In WUist, the Court found that deadtime spent in custody before
conviction could be counted against mandatory minimum sentences. One
of the reasons given for this sensible result was the need to maintain
proportionality. If deadtime was not counted, proportionality would be
disrupted by allowing the worst offenders, who received more than the
mandatory minimum of four-years imprisonment, to have their pre-trial
custody deducted from their sentence while the best offender, who only
merited the mandatory minimum, would have no such advantage. For
example, if the best offender who is sentenced to the four-year minimum
has been in custody for a year before conviction, he or she would serve five
years. A worse offender who was sentenced to six years imprisonment, but
who also served a year of dead time might only serve four years if given two
for one credit for the year spent in a remand centre awaiting trial. The
result would be grossly unfair and disproportionate because the offender

400
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who committed the more serious crime would serve less time than the
offender who committed the least serious version of the crime. In Wust, a
concern about maintaining proportionality between the best and worst
offenders sentenced for the same offence played an important role in
allowing deadtime to be counted against a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment. Proportionality effectively reduced the amount of time
served.
Wust, however, is exceptional. In most cases, the same concern
about maintaining proportionality will lead to increased punishment on the
basis that a mandatory minimum sentence is, by definition, designed to
catch the best offender and offence, and provides a floor or starting point
for a proportionate scale of punishment. In a sentencing environment that
ruthlessly respects proportionality, all other offenders should receive a
greater sentence than the best offender and offence caught by the
mandatory minimum. In her concurrence in Morrisey,83 Madame Justice
Arbour follows this logic by suggesting that mandatory minimums should
act as "an inflationary floor" for sentences "setting a new minimum
punishment applicable to the so-called 'best' offender whose conduct is
caught by these provisions. The mandatory minimum must not become the
standard imposed on all but the very worst offender who has committed the
offence in the very worst circumstances." She expressly disagreed with the
idea that the new four-year minimum sentence "should not result in a
proportional general increase beyond the range of sentences found in pre1996 cases" even though, as Julian Roberts demonstrates, the available
empirical evidence suggests that sentences for an offence often cluster
around the mandatory minimum penalty. " The logic of Madame Justice
Arbour's position-the logic of ordinal proportionality-is that the
enactment of a mandatory sentence that catches the best offender and the
best offence within a particular crime should require punishment above the
mandatory minimum for more blameworthy offenders. A concern about
maintaining the proportionality of relative punishments can increase

83Supranote 7at 133. The converse, recognized by lower courts after Snith,was that even though
Smith had not been caught by the mandatory minimum of seven-years imprisonment, his sentence
should be reduced from eight to six years because the inflationary seven-year floor on punishment had
been knocked out by the Court.
84 The Canadian Sentencing Commission found that almost all firearm-based sentences clustered
around the one-year mandatory minimum while the most recent data suggest that two thirds of firearm
-based sentences cluster around the new four-year mandatory minimum. See J.V. Roberts, "Mandatory
Minimum Sentences of Imprisonment: Exploring the Consequences for the Sentencing Process" (2001)
39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 305 at n. 45, 47.
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punishment to keep up with the inflated floor that Parliament has set for
the best offender and the best offence.
Ordinal proportionality refers to the requirement that punishment
reflect the comparative seriousness of crimes. As such, it relates to the
pattern of punishment and ensures that punishment accounts for the
relative seriousness of different crimes both within an offence and among
different offences. As Andrew von Hirsch has explained, principles of
ordinal proportionality require parity so that "differences in severity of
punishments" are allowed "only to the extent that these differences reflect
variations in the degree of blameworthiness of the conduct. '' Madame
Justice Arbour's position in Maust reflected a similar concern that a person
who committed a more serious and blameworthy version of a crime subject
to a mandatory minimum sentence of four-years imprisonment not be
treated the same or less harshly than a person who has committed a less
serious or blameworthy version of the same crime. However, Madame
Justice Arbour's logic and the principle of ordinal proportionality can be
taken further to include a concern with the "rank ordering" of different
offences in the sense that "punishing one crime more than another
expresses more disapproval for the former crime, so that it is justified only
if that crime is more serious. Punishments thus are ordered on a penalty
scale so that their relative severity reflects the seriousness ranking of the
crimes involved."' 6
It is possible to argue that a constitutional mandatory minimum of
four-years imprisonment for an unintentional killing with a firearm should
increase the punishment tariff, not only for that crime, but other crimes. If
an unintentional killing with a firearm merits four years of imprisonment,
the intentional use of a firearm in an attempted murder or a robbery could
require much more than four years. A concern about preserving
proportionality means that mandatory sentences that have been upheld as
constitutional by the Court may ratchet up all sentences. The result will be
an upward spiral of increased punitiveness as the constitutional benchmark

$5 A. von Hirsch, "Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment" in M TonaDy ed., Crme
and
Justice, voL 16 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992| 55 [hereinafter "Proprutonahty"l. For
further elaboration, see A. von Hirsch, Censure andSanctens (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993) at 1.
S6 "Proportionality," ibid.at 79.
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of when a sentence becomes grossly disproportionate will be an upward
moving target.87
Roberts argues that the upward spiral in punishment from a
mandatory minimum sentence contemplated by Madame Justice Arbour
should not occur. The available empirical evidence supports his conclusion
because trial judges tend to cluster their sentences around the mandatory
minimum penalty, a practice that Roberts concedes violates ordinal
proportionality by imposing the same punishment, that is, the mandatory
minimum sentence, on less serious and more serious versions of the crime.
He also argues that judges should not ratchet up sentences from the new
four-year mandatory minimum sentence because that mandatory minimum
is itself not proportionate.
The problem with this argument is that the Supreme Court has
already concluded that the four-year mandatory minimum sentence is
proportionate or at least not so grossly disproportionate so as to constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. 88 Thus, four years is now the starting point
approved by both Parliament and the Supreme Court. Given the role of
proportionality as the fundamental principle of sentencing, there is a strong
case that sentences should be ratcheted up to reflect the floor or starting
point which applies to the least serious version of the crime.
The point of this argument is that the ability of proportionality to
increase punishment once a mandatory minimum sentence has been upheld
as constitutional and not grossly disproportionate, reflects a weakness in
many desert theories that focus more on questions of ordinal
proportionality and retaining a precise relationship between punishment
and the seriousness of crimes, and less on questions of cardinal
proportionality, which examine the starting point for the internally
consistent scale of punishment. Desert considerations that focus on ordinal
proportionality seem to aspire to a just distribution of punishment while
being agnostic about the justness of the starting point or anchor for their
finely calibrated scale. Professor von Hirsch, a prominent desert theorist,
admits that the principle of cardinal proportionality places "only broad and
imprecise constraints" on the anchoring or starting point for the

87 Madame Justice Arbour observes that "[s]ince the inflationary effect of the mandatory
floor
is likely to increase all penalties for this offence, there will arguably be fewer such cases for which four
years will be grossly disproportionate and therefore unconstitutional." Aorrisey, supra note 7 at 95.
88 On the definitive or jurispathic nature of Supreme Court rulings, see R.M. Cover, "Violence
and the Word" (1985) 95 Yale L.J. 1601.
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appropriate scale of punishment and that the anchoring point may simply
be a conventional expression of the "penal traditions of the jurisdiction.""
In the section 12 cases, the starting point has been established by
Parliament's decision to enact a mandatory minimum sentence and the
Court's decision to apply an increased margin of deference to such
sentences. Once the Court has decided that four years of imprisonment for
even unintentional killings with a firearm is not grossly disproportionate,
it becomes easier to uphold other mandatory sentences and to ratchet up
all punishments to maintain ordinal proportionality with the legislative and
constitutional starting point established by the mandatory minimum. If trial
judges do not ratchet up punishment to account for the fact that the
mandatory minimum sentence, by definition, catches the least serious
version of a particular crime, it will be because they have ignored or evaded
the remorselessly inflationary logic of ordinal proportionality, a logic that
kicks in once the Supreme Court has accepted a mandatory sentence as
valid.
It is difficult to fault Madame Justice Arbour for struggling to
maintain proportionality after Parliament has proclaimed it as the
fundamental principle of sentencing. The Court has done much the same
in its conditional sentencing cases by trying to carve out a proportionate
space between probation and prison," perhaps at the expense of the
restraint principle.9 Nevertheless, as Roberts suggests, judicial concerns
about maintaining proportionality in light of mandatory sentences attribute
a coherence to Parliament's decision to enact a mandatory sentence that is
not realistic. Most mandatory sentences have been enacted by Parliament

$9However, von Hirsch goes on to suggest that "normatia onsiderattons may justlify
altenng this

convention. One such consideration is the goal of reducing the suffering .ited on offenders."
"Proportionality," supra note 84 at 83. Another normative principle that should inform the anchoring
point is the need for restraint in the use of imprisonment. For an argument that Roberts. in other recent
work, focuses on parity and ordinal proportionality at the e'pensiz of restraint and cardinal

proportionality, see J.Rudin & K. Roach, "Broken Promises: A Respon s e to Stenng and Robert's

'Empty Promises" (2002) 65 Sask. L Rev. (forthcoming) [hereinafter "Broken Promtses'l rcslnding
to P. Stenning & J. Roberts, "Empty Promises: Parliament, The Supreme Court, and the Sentencing
of Aboriginal Offenders" (2001) 64 Sask. L Rev. 137 [hereinafter "Empty Promilss"].
90 J.V. Roberts, "The Hunt for the Paper Tiger" (1999) 42 C.LQ. 33; and A. Manson,
"The
Conditional Sentence: A Canadian Approach to Sentencing Reform, or Doing the Time WarpAgain''
(2001) 44 C.LQ. 375.

On the possible net wvidening effects of extending conditional sentences beyond the time
warranted by a sentence of imprisonment, see K. Roach & J.Rudin,"Ghdue: The Judicial and Pahitcal
Reception of a Promising Decision" (2000) 42 Can. J.Crim. 355 at 369(f, and D. N~orth, "The 'Catch
22' of Conditional Sentencing"
p2001) 44 C.LQ. 342
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to respond to a perceived crisis. Little or no thought is given to the systemic
effects of a mandatory minimum sentence on sentencing policy."
At the same time, when the Supreme Court upholds a mandatory
minimum sentence, its decision that Parliament's starting point for the best
offender and the least serious version of the crime is constitutional and not
grossly disproportionate, must be seen as a coherent statement about
cardinal proportionality and the anchoring point of punishment. In light of
this approach, trial judges who continue to give the best and worst offender
the same mandatory minimum sentence can be faulted for not respecting
the fundamental principle of (ordinal) proportionality in sentencing. The
neglect of cardinal proportionality in most desert theories leaves them
vulnerable to this ratcheting up effect once Parliament and the Supreme
Court approve a mandatory sentence as the starting point for punishment.
The question remains whether trial judges will follow Madame
Justice Arbour's suggestions in Morrisey and ratchet up punishments to
maintain proportionality in light of mandatory minimum sentences. If this
happens, the general increase in the sentencing tariff, at least for crimes
affected by mandatory minimum sentences, will be another unanticipated,
costly, and undesirable consequence of Parliament's political decision to
place a minimum sentence into a sentencing environment that gives pride
of place to the proportionality principle.
Like Roberts, I hope that this general ratcheting up of penalties
from the mandatory minimum sentence does not occur because of my
commitment to restraint in the use of imprisonment. At the same time,
however, I cannot conclude that a refusal by trial judges to ratchet
sentences up from the mandatory minimum can be justified without second
guessing the Supreme Court's determination that the four-year mandatory
minimum penalty was not a grossly disproportionate anchor for
punishment.

92 When Parliamentarians have thought about the effects of mandatory sentences on sentencing
policy, they have expressed a concern that the mandatory minimum sentence will act as a ceiling on
punishment for the offence, an observation supported by available empirical evidence about the
sentencing practices of judges, but one that defies the principle of ordinal proportionality outlined
above. N. Crutcher, "Mandatory Minimum Penalties of Imprisonment: An Historical Analysis" (2001)
44 C.L.Q. 279 at 303.
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Getting Caughton the Wrong Side of the Punitiveand Restorative
Divide

Another major change in sentencing since Smith has been the
introduction of conditional sentences and new restorative purposes for
sentencing. In Gladue93 and Prou&,9 the Court recognized that these new
features of sentencing were designed to reduce Canada's high rate of
incarceration, especially among Aboriginal people. This recognition of the
problem of over-incarceration could have been used by the Court to
reaffirm its willingness in Smith to invalidate mandatory minimum
sentences as a means to achieve restraint in the use of imprisonment.
However, there are reasons to believe that the Court's new dichotomy
between the punitive and restorative principles of sentencing might have
made it easier to justify mandatory sentences.
In the conditional sentencing cases, the Court contrasts
denunciation, deterrence, and separation as punitive purposes of
sentencing and, rehabilitation, reparation, and acceptance of responsibility
as restorative purposes?5 Taken together, and at the risk of oversimplification, the conditional sentencing cases suggest that some crimessexual assault and dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm-will
often call for a greater emphasis on punitive as opposed to restorative
purposes of sentencing and that imprisonment vill be seen as a particularly
effective way to deter and denounce such crimes. The Court is careful not
to preclude the use of conditional sentences for such crimes and it
incorporates some punitive elements into conditional sentences. However,
the overall message of the cases is clear-some crimes require deterrence

91 Supra note 10. This case did not inole a conditional sentence but rather an appzal by the
accused from a three-yearsentence for manslaughter and the meaningofs, 713.2(c)vhich pr~idesthat
"all a-ailable sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should b.
considered for alloffenders,with particular attention to the circumstancesofabonginaloffenders."The
Court dismissed Janice Gladue's appeal from sentence, but it noted faourably that she had received
day parole after six months on strict conditions including substance abuse treatment. If she had killed
her spouse with a firearm rather than a knife, she v-ould hae been caught by the new four-year
mandatory minimum sentence. On the harmful effects f mandatorysentences on Abarignaloffender-,
see L N. Chartrand, "Aboriginal Peoples and Mandatory Sentencing"(201) 39 O3Zoode Hall U,. 449
and R. Pelletier, "The Nullification of Section 718.2(e): Aggravating Aboriginal O.er-Representation
in Canadian Prisons" (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall U. 469. For contrasting 'ie7.s about the reference to
Aboriginal offenders in s. 718.2(e), see: "Empty Promises," supra note C9; and "Broken Psomzas "
supra note 89.
94
Supra note 10.
95 Ibid. at 115ff.
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and denunciation, and prison is the best way to deter and denounce serious
crimes.
How does this conditional sentencing jurisprudence relate to
mandatory sentences? In section 742.1 of the Code, Parliament has
excluded all offences subject to a minimum term of imprisonment from a
conditional sentence. A person convicted of a second drunk driving offence
and subject to its mandatory minimum term of fourteen-days imprisonment
will not be eligible for a conditional sentence even though one requiring
treatment and involving some punitive aspects might better fulfill all the
punitive and restorative purposes of sentencing. Even the crime in
Morrisey-criminal negligence causing death with a firearm-could
conceivably result in a conditional sentence were it not for Parliament's
categorical exclusion of manslaughter with a firearm from conditional
sentences by virtue of section 742.1. Had Morrisey been a candidate for a
conditional sentence, he might have been deterred and rehabilitated by
conditions of treatment for his drinking problem and a firearm prohibition.
His remorse could have facilitated acknowledgment of the harm done and
reparation to the victim's family. Punitive aspects such as house arrest could
be added to the conditional sentence in order to ensure that it was
consistent with denunciation, general deterrence and, that it was a
proportionate response to the gravity of the crime and to the degree of
moral responsibility.
The categorical exclusion of offences with a minimum term of
imprisonment from conditional sentences suggests that Parliament believes
that an actual prison term is necessary to achieve the penal purposes of
minimum sentences. In the conditional sentencing cases, the Court has also
recognized that the punitive purposes of sentencing are generally, but not
exclusively, associated with incarceration. When Parliament enacts a
mandatory sentence in one stroke of a legislative pen, it precludes the use
of a conditional sentence and provides compelling evidence that it has
decided to place greater emphasis on the punitive, as opposed to the
restorative purposes of sentencing.
Restorative principles of sentencing have been recognized only to
be discounted and discarded when the crime seems serious. Parliament's
decision to enact a mandatory minimum sentence has been interpreted as
an important sign that the punitive purposes of sentencing are far more
important than the restorative ones, not just for murder, but also for
manslaughter with a firearm. Recent section 12 cases suggest that the Court
will be inclined to uphold mandatory sentences on the somewhat circular
basis that, by enacting a mandatory sentence, Parliament has made a
legitimate choice to stress the punitive purposes of sentencing over the
restorative ones.
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In Morrisey, the Court took the very existence of the mandatory
sentence as an indication that Parliament has decided to stress general
deterrence, denunciation, and retribution for the offence of manslaughter
with a firearm. It then upheld the mandatory sentence, in part, on the basis
that Parliament was entitled to stress those penal purposes over
rehabilitation, specific deterrence, and the restorative purposes of
sentences. In Latimer,97 the Court readily admitted "that in this case the
sentencing principles of rehabilitation, specific deterrence and protection
are not triggered for consideration," but held that the mandatory sentence
was justified for other reasons, including denunciation and general
deterrence of murdering vulnerable people.
The Court's willingness to discount the restorative principles of
sentencing, including concerns about rehabilitation and specific deterrence
that figured so prominently in Smith, may also explain a cryptic statement
in Latimer.S While the test for section 12 review requires a consideration
of the effects of punishment on the individual and the various goals of
sentencing, the Court warned that "not all of these matters will be relevant
to the analysis and none of these standing alone will be decisive to a
determination of gross disproportionality." The problem is that the original
test for gross disproportionality in Smith relied on factors, notably whether
punishment was required to rehabilitate and deter the particular offender,
that are no longer emphasized in the section 12 analysis.
Once again, we are left desperately searching for Smith. If Smith
came to the Court today there might well be considerable support for Mr.
Justice McIntyre's arguments that Parliament was entitled to stress the
deterrence and denunciation of the drug trade over the injustice of
sentencing a small-time teenaged offender to seven-years imprisonment,
even though the offender presents no threat to the community, needs no
rehabilitation, and would likely be destroyed by imprisonment. Today, the
hypothetical teenaged offender saved in Smith would probably be excluded
as an uncommon offender. Even if considered, the teenaged offender could
be placed on the wrong side of the punitive-restorative line because of
Parliament's enactement of the mandatory penalty.
The Court's acceptance of the restorative purposes of sentencing
has had the ironic effect of legitimating its punitive purposes. It is
dangerous to be caught on the wrong side of the punitive-restorative line.

96
97

Supra note 7 at 115-S.
Supra note 5 at 160.

9S Ibid. at 157.
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Once offenders commit a crime that Parliament has placed into punitive
territory, their restorative and rehabilitative claims will be discounted to the
extent that they suggest that a fit sentence would be a conditional sentence
or an imprisonment sentence less than the mandatory minimum penalty.
Such offenders will also find that the courts will be quite deferential to
Parliament's decision to place an offence on the punitive side of the line by
enacting a mandatory minimum sentence.
V.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECTION 12
JURISPRUDENCE FOR SENTENCING POLICY AND
REFORM

The recent section 12 cases suggest that Parliament can create
mandatory sentences without worrying very much that they may be
invalidated on the basis of hypothetical best offenders. Morrisey and
Latimer suggest that the Court will defer to Parliament's judgment on the
appropriate mix of penal policy even to the point of applying mandatory
sentences that are not necessary to deter or rehabilitate the particular
offender before the Court. Some dicta in Latimer9 suggest that the Court
may have completely abdicated review of mandatory sentences under
section 12 of the Charter.The Court stated that "the choice is Parliament's
on the use of minimum sentences, though considerable difference of
opinion continues on the wisdom of employing minimum sentences from
a criminal law policy or penological point of view." Parliament should
beware, however, that a decision to enact a mandatory minimum sentence
in order to make a statement about a particular crime at a particular time
may have long term effects if trial judges and courts of appeal follow the
logic of seeing the new minimum as a floor that catches the best offender
and consequentially ratchet up the tariff for all other offenders.
Parliament's decision to enact a mandatory minimum penalty may not only
have unforeseen and unintended effects when applied to the best offender,
but may also have the unintended and costly consequence of raising the
tariff for the offence subject to the minimum.
Can the Court's more deferential approach to mandatory sentences
since Smith be justified? Commentators who saw cases such as Smith as an

99Ibid.at 161. Following the hints in Madame Justice Arbour's concurrence in Morrisey, any future
judicial interventions are likely to be in the form of constitutional exemptions for exceptional offenders
and not declarations of invalidity of the type used in Smith. However, such interventions are not likely
given that the Court has yet to indicate that courts can order such constitutional exemptions and some
courts of appeal have resisted granting them.
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unwarranted form of judicial activism would argue that the Court in
Morrisey and Latimer was properly deferring to Parliament's determination
of sentencing policy. Given the multiple and often conflicting purposes of
sentencing, it can be argued that the elected legislature and not the
appointed judiciary should determine the emphasis that should be placed
on particular sentencing purposes for particular crimes. A continuation of
the Smith approach of invalidating mandatory sentences on the basis of
extreme and even far-fetched hypothetical best offenders that could be
caught by them, might have produced a conflict between the Court and
Parliament over the seriousness of particular crimes and the appropriate
blend of penal policies' t°
The problem with the argument for judicial restraint is that it does
not situate the judicial review of mandatory sentences in the context of the
ongoing dialogue that can occur between the Court and Parliament under
the Charter,or give weight to concerns that the Court, and only the Court,
can bring to that dialogue."' 1 In defending the legacy of Smith it is necessary
to go beyond the conclusion that it was an activist decision. First, it is
important to recognize that Smith need not have been the last word on how
society will punish drug importers. Justice Lamer contemplated the
possibility of a legislative reply that would have limited the imposition of
the mandatory seven-year sentence "to the importing of certain quantities,
to certain specific narcotics of the schedule, to repeat offenders, or even to
a combination of these factors."'"2 Parliament did not take up this invitation
and the penalty for importing narcotics still has no mandatory sentence.
This inactivity can be taken as a sign that mandatory penalties for drug
importers were not a policy priority for our elected government.
A decision to invalidate the mandatory penalty for second degree
murder in Latimer also would not necessarily have constituted the fimal
word on the matter. Parliament could have crafted the exact parameters of
a third degree of murder that would not be tied to a mandatory penalty or

100 The critics of Charter activism fall on both the left and the right of the political sp:ctrum,
Compare the common criticism of Smifd, supranote 2, as un-arranted judicial activism in R. I' opff
& F.L M%
orton, CharterPoztics (Toronto: Nelson, 1992) at I6-'?S7 and M. Mandel, The Charterof rvghts
andthieLegalizationof Potiticsin Canada,rev, ed,, (Toronto: Thompson, 1994) at Z07-11. Onsimtlanttcs
between the right and left critiques of judicial acthism, see The Supreme Court on Tnal.supra note 42
at SO-SI.
101 On dialogue, see: P. Hogg & A. Bushell, "The Chartcr Dialogue Bewt cen Courts and
Legislatures (Or Perhaps the CharterIsn't Such a Bad Thing After All)" (1997)35 O.-,Zde Hall L,
75; and "Dialogues," supra note 45.
102 Supra note 2 at 10S0.
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one as severe as life imprisonment with ineligibility for parole for ten years.
It might also have responded with a presumptive, as opposed to a
mandatory sentence, and a requirement that judges justify any departure
from the presumptive sentence of life imprisonment on the basis of
exceptional circumstances. This approach has been taken in England. 103
Another legislative option, as was recommended by the Canadian
Sentencing Commission, would be to enact sentencing guidelines. Judicial
activism in striking down mandatory sentences under the Charter does not
mean that the Court must impose the final word on matters of sentencing
and penal policy.
Another constructive by-product of a robust dialogue between
courts and legislatures over mandatory penalties might be greater
specificity in defining offences. A legislative response to Smith would have
served the useful purpose of encouraging Parliament to differentiate
between importers who bring small amounts of drugs across the border for
personal use and those who are engaged in large-scale commercial
enterprises."° Likewise, active judicial supervision of the effects of
mandatory sentences may persuade legislatures of the need to change
mandatory sentences to presumptive sentences. This result has occurred
with respect to section 113 of the Code, which allows mandatory weapon
prohibitions to be lifted in extraordinary and non-dangerous situations in
which offenders need a gun for sustenance hunting and trapping, or to
pursue the only vocation open to them. This provision might not have been
enacted had a number of courts of appeal not held that the application of
the automatic prohibition constituted cruel and unusual punishment and
merited constitutional exemptions. If courts had simply deferred to the
valid objective of deterring and denouncing weapons offences, the grossly
disproportionate effects of this previously mandatory penalty on
exceptional offenders may never have come to light.
Judicial activism in invalidating overly broad mandatory sentences
can be defended on the basis that the independent judiciary is in a much
better position than the elected legislature to evaluate the effects of
mandatory penalties on particular offenders. Only the courts are in a
position to see the actual effects that mandatory sentences have on the
variety of offenders who appear before them. When Parliament enacts

Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (U.K.), 1997 c. 43 s.
2.
The new Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996 c. 19 s. 6 already shows some
differentiation by relating the drug imported (but not the quantity) to new and variable maximums of
life, ten years, and three years of imprisonment.

2001]

Searchingfor Smith: The Constitutionalityof MMS

mandatory sentences, it must, of necessity, focus on the seriousness of the
offence and hope that the mandatory sentence will deter and denounce the
crime. There is generally no lobby or no voice for the small-time or
exceptional offender. When offenders are considered at all, they are often
presented in a manner that stereotypes and demonizes them.
Parliamentarians generally think of the drug cartels, the Clifford Olsons,
and the Paul Bernardos, not the teenaged-importers of a joint, the
desperate drug "mules," the Robert Latimers, or even more sympathetic
offenders. To the extent that an effective lobby against mandatory
sentences might develop, a temporary, but exciting alliance between civil
libertarians, defence lawyers, feminists, and the representatives of
disadvantaged groups who can speak to the injustice of mandatory
sentences, may be required.
I hope that such an alliance is formed and that it slows don,m the
increased use of mandatory sentences in Canada. At the same time, I am
not terribly optimistic about the success of such an alliance given the
difficulties of organizing a diverse lobby and the fact that any lobby against
mandatory sentences will be unable to appeal to a strong and consistent
record by the Supreme Court in invalidating mandatory sentences.
A return to Smith and tovigorousjudicial enforcement against cruel
and unusual punishment by striking doxvn mandatory sentences has the
potential to produce a robust and democratic dialogue betveen the courts
and the legislature that considers both the effect of punishment on
offenders and the adequacy of less draconian alternatives. Deferential
judicial enforcement of section 12 as applied to mandatory sentences, runs
the danger of producing complacent crime control and punitive victims'
rights monologues that assume that mandatory sentences are necessary to
deter and denounce serious crime.
Of all the recent decisions, the Court's position in Morrisey is the
most disappointing and the one most likely to encourage Parliament to
enact more mandatory minimum penalties. The Court has accepted a
significant mandatory minimum of four-years imprisonment for a very
broad offence that can include killings with firearms that range from near
accidents to near murders. The promise made in Creighton that the judge
would use sentencing to individualize the sentence to the broad range of
conduct caught by manslaughter and the great variety of offender
characteristics that are not relevant in determining objective fault, cannot
now be realized, at least not for offenders that commit manslaughter with
a firearm. A decision to invalidate the mandatory sentence in Mordsey
would not necessarily have prevented the government from using
mandatory penalties in its attempt to deter intentional crimes with firearms
or from using presumptive as opposed to mandatory sentences. If four-
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years imprisonment is permissible for criminal negligence causing death
with a firearm, then such a mandatory penalty could probably be imposed
for most intentional criminal offences. The choice over mandatory
sentences may well be Parliament's and it may only be the wisdom and selfrestraint of Parliament that will prevent the whole-sale introduction of a
raft of American-style mandatory penalties.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Smith stands as a reminder of a distinctive Canadian approach to
punishment and Charteradjudication. The seven-year minimum sentence
for importing narcotics struck down in that case would be a very lenient
sentence south of the border and American courts would never have
concerned themselves with the effects of mandatory penalties on
hypothetical offenders. The bold statement of constitutional principles in
Smith has been replaced by a more cautious form of constitutional
minimalism and deference to Parliament including an increased sensitivity
to victims' rights.
The concern in Smith with whether a mandatory penalty is grossly
disproportionate in light of what is necessary to deter or rehabilitate
particular offenders, has been replaced by deference to Parliament's
decision to stress punitive purposes of sentencing over restorative ones.
Morrisey suggests that the Court may defer to a legislative crime control
agenda that uses mandatory sentences to denounce and deter a broad range
of crimes that fall short of absolute liability offences but include crimes
based on non-individuated objective standards of liability. Those
commentators who are opposed to mandatory penalties are left searching
for Smith and for a strong judicial and constitutional voice in support of
individualized justice. The return of such a voice would be a welcome
addition to our ongoing democratic dialogues on crime and punishment.

